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## Foreign Direct Investment and Debt Financing in Emerging Economies

The rich dynamics of capital flows is an important characteristic of business cycles in emerging market economies. In the data external debt is always procyclical, while FDI is procyclical only in normal times. We provide a microfounded rationale for this pattern by linking financial shocks to capital flows. For this purpose, we build a small open economy model in which firms are subject to borrowing constraints, and are either owned domestically or by foreign investors who purchase firms through FDI. During a financial crisis, the valuation gap per unit net worth between foreign and domestic investors widens, which triggers more FDI inflow. Our model produces business cycle moments consistent with empirical observations.

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THIS PAPER STUDIES THE BUSINESS cycle pattern of foreign direct investment (henceforth FDI) and external debt inflows into emerging economies. During the past few decades, a wave of financial openness has swept emerging economies and induced large foreign capital inflows. Many papers have documented the dynamic pattern and composition of capital inflows (Aguiar and Gopinath 2005, Smith and Valderrama 2009, Broner et al. 2013, Alquist, Mukherjee, and Tesar 2016). In this paper, we provide a microfounded rationale for different behaviors of capital financing in both normal times and financial crises.

We begin our analysis by presenting stylized facts about the dynamics of FDI and external debt financing in emerging economies. A key feature is that the cyclical pattern of FDI is different in normal periods and crises times: in normal periods, FDI and external debt financing are both procyclical; during financial crises, external debt

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financing still moves alongside the overall state of the economy, but the correlation of FDI and output drops substantially from positive to slightly negative. Examples of this feature can be found in the 1990s financial crises in Asia and Latin America. Following these, external debt financing turned negative in crisis-affected emerging economies. However, FDI remained positive and kept adding to the FDI stock (Athukorala 2003).

The key contribution of this paper is to formally model a “fire-sale” channel in an otherwise standard small open economy real business cycle model and show that such a model can account for the observed pattern of FDI and external debt in normal periods and crisis times. Krugman (2000) observes that following the Latin crisis in 1995 and Asian Financial Crisis in 1997–98, credit channels to local firms were broken, so heavily indebted firms were forced to fire sell their assets. International multinational enterprises (henceforth MNCs), which could obtain financing elsewhere and were not as severely affected by the crises, took this opportunity to these acquire cheap assets. As a result, FDI in the short and medium term increased after the crisis. The idea of fire-sale has been discussed by some papers (see, e.g., Aguiar and Gopinath 2005, Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer 2011, Alquist, Mukherjee, and Tesar 2016), yet to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to embed it in a full-fledged dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study the dynamic properties of capital financing in normal and crisis times.

To capture the fire-sale channel, we model domestic firms and MNC-owned firms in a small open economy. They are different in two respects. First, firms are subject to borrowing constraints following Gertler and Karadi (2011). With this assumption, we depart from Modigliani and Miller (1958), so different forms of financing are not perfectly substitutable and various types of capital flows at the country level behave differently at different stages of the business cycle. To reflect the fact that MNC-owned firms have better access to international financial markets than domestic firms, we assume MNC-owned firms face a looser borrowing constraint. Second, we assume that when a domestic firm is acquired by an MNC, the firm’s productivity improves. The productivity improvement captures in reduced form a combination of factors including knowledge spillover, improved governance and brand value, which are shown to be important empirically (such as Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar 2009, Aitken and Harrison 1999, Alfaro and Charlton 2013). With these distinctions, an MNC-owned firm has a larger value than a domestically owned firm, everything else equal. The valuation wedge induces flows of FDI. Moreover, a bigger wedge gives foreign multinationals larger incentives to acquire domestic firms. The acquisition price, or FDI inflow, is determined by Nash bargaining that splits the difference in valuation of the firm between a domestic seller and an international buyer.

This setup generates different patterns of FDI and external debt flows in normal and crisis times. During a crisis, a negative financial shock tightens the constraint faced by domestic firms, depresses the value of the firm to domestic households, and enlarges the valuation wedge between a domestic firm and an MNC-owned firm. As a consequence, domestically owned firms borrow less and FDI increases. On the other hand, a generic negative productivity shock impairs the balance sheets of domestically owned firms, reduces the size of acquired firms, and leads to a fall in

both FDI and external debt. We calibrate our model with emerging market data and show that it can generate procyclical FDI and external debt in normal times when financial shocks are muted, and negatively correlated FDI and output in crises times when financial shocks are turned on.

There is a commonly expressed notion that weak currency and the anticipation of a future currency appreciation may trigger foreign acquisitions in crisis-hit economies (see, e.g., Froot and Stein 1991, Blonigen 1997, Albuquerque, Loayza, and Servn 2005, Daude and Fratzscher 2008).<sup>1</sup> To address this channel, we extend our model to include endogenous real exchange rate adjustment and a portfolio choice problem of domestic and international lending by the firms. We find that expected real exchange rate appreciation increases the foreign investors' valuation gap directly, therefore increasing the attractiveness of acquisitions. Exchange rate adjustments, however, may decrease the value of FDI by reducing the size of acquired firms, especially when they rely heavily on imported intermediate goods. The overall effect of a financial shock to FDI in an economy with exchange rate adjustments is still positive. Hence, our main results are robust to the inclusion of an exchange rate appreciation channel.

Our analysis is related to a large and growing literature on capital flows across countries. Ju and Wei (2010) provide a two-country model to study two-way capital flows with a focus on corporate governance and property rights. Wang, Wen, and Xu (2017) explain the two-way capital flow pattern between China and United States using credit frictions. Mendoza, Quadrini, and Ríos-Rull (2009) attribute the difference in a country's financial portfolio to differences in financial development. Devereux and Sutherland (2009) and He and Luk (2016) consider capital flows to an emerging economy using endogenous portfolio choice models. They do not consider borrowing constraints, so the equilibrium asset holding is driven by the hedging characteristics of the different types of assets. Different from our paper, this literature focuses on the long-run determinants rather than the cyclical pattern of capital flows.

There is a literature using asymmetric information to address issues related to FDI and capital flows. For instance, Razin, Sadka, and Yuen (1998) use informational frictions to account for the "pecking order of capital inflows" across different asset types. Goldstein and Razin (2006) assume that FDI investors have information advantage relative to foreign portfolio investors. They argue that, as a result of a lemon problem, the FDI investor has a low resale value. Benhima and Cordonier (2017) assume information advantage of domestic investors and study the pattern of gross capital flows in response to news shocks and sentiment shocks. In our model, the assumption that domestically owned firms face tighter borrowing constraints can be motivated by an information-asymmetric argument as well, but the focus of our model is to match the dynamics of capital flows in emerging economies, and we choose to abstract from an explicit information structure.

1. Froot and Stein (1991) use imperfect capital market to explain why a currency appreciation may actually increase foreign investment by a firm. Blonigen (1997) uses data on Japanese acquisitions of U.S. firms and finds that real dollar depreciations make Japanese acquisitions more likely in U.S. industries. More recent empirical papers by Albuquerque, Loayza, and Servn (2005) and Daude and Fratzscher (2008) also find that weak currency is an important factor that drives cross boarder investment.

The paper closest in spirit to ours is Smith and Valderrama (2009), which studies the comovement between FDI and debt in a small open economy setup with costly debt financing. However, our paper differs from Smith and Valderrama (2009) in several aspects. First, our analysis reveals that the composition of capital financing differs between normal period and episodes of financial crises. In contrast, Smith and Valderrama (2009) discuss the substitution between FDI and debt in general but make no distinction between normal and crises times. Second, Smith and Valderrama (2009) assume reduced-form adjustment costs when raising debt in international markets, whereas we model financial frictions by explicitly considering an enforcement problem between borrowers and lenders, which allows us to study financial shocks in a nontrivial manner. Third, we show that, under our model setup, a firm's value has an analytical solution, which allows us to study a larger model with richer dynamics.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides empirical evidence. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes calibration of the model. Section 4 analyzes the model properties and quantitative results. Section 5 extends the benchmark model to include the real exchange rate and portfolio choice between domestic and foreign debt. Section 6 concludes.

## 1. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

We first present stylized facts concerning FDI and external debt inflows to emerging economies. Our sample contains annual data for 1980–2015 for 11 emerging economies including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey. FDI is measured as FDI capital inflows as a percent of GDP. (Summary statistics are provided in Appendix F.) External debt financing is measured as portfolio debt and other debt instrument inflows as a percent of GDP. In order to analyze capital inflows around crises, we use the Broner et al. (2013) indicator to capture the beginning of a crisis on an annual basis.<sup>2</sup> That covers all major banking, currency, and debt crises in the history of emerging market economies. According to their crisis definition, each country has at least two crises in our sample period, and there are in total 52 crisis-year observations. A detailed list of the year of these is provided in Appendix E.

To explore the cyclical properties of capital inflows in normal and crisis periods, we consider the following regression:

$$Y_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \widetilde{\text{gdp}}_{i,t} + \beta_2 (\widetilde{\text{gdp}}_{i,t} \times D_{i,t}) + \gamma' X_{i,t} + I_i + Q_t + \epsilon_{i,t}. \quad (1)$$

All data are annual. The dependent variable is either FDI or external debt inflows to GDP ratio. We use the domestic per capita GDP growth rate  $\widetilde{\text{gdp}}_{i,t}$  to capture the stage of business cycles of emerging economy  $i$  at year  $t$ . The crisis dummy,  $D_{i,t}$ ,

2. We conduct robustness checks and confirm that our empirical results are robust to alternative crisis definitions. Details can be provided from the authors.

TABLE 1  
CYCLICALITY OF CAPITAL INFLOWS

	(1) FDI	(2) FDI	(3) FDI	(4) Debt	(5) Debt	(6) Debt
GDP growth	0.0732*** (0.0233)	0.0894*** (0.0206)	0.0706*** (0.0241)	0.155*** (0.0505)	0.194*** (0.0576)	0.104* (0.0599)
GDP growth × Crisis dummy	-0.0902* (0.0477)	-0.0944** (0.0406)	-0.0899** (0.0379)	0.492*** (0.103)	0.399*** (0.121)	0.340*** (0.108)
Exchange rate regime			0.0250 (0.0264)			-0.331*** (0.0702)
Capital control			0.457*** (0.0842)			0.645*** (0.190)
Constant	1.723*** (0.104)	0.422 (0.346)	0.535 (0.444)	1.326*** (0.225)	2.269* (1.332)	4.968*** (1.208)
GDP growth and cross term	-0.0170 (0.0400)	-0.0050 (0.0349)	-0.0194 (0.0312)	0.647*** (0.0867)	0.593*** (0.1145)	0.444*** (0.1080)
Country dummy	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Year dummy	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	395	395	340	391	391	340
Adj. $R^2$	0.020	0.489	0.537	0.146	0.312	0.407

NOTE: OLS estimation results. Heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All flows are gross inflows as a percent of GDP. FDI refers foreign direct investment capital inflows. Debt refers both portfolio debt and other debt instruments inflows as in balance of payments. Annual data are from 1980 to 2015. Countries included are Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey.  
\* $p < 0.10$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

equals 1 when there is a crisis and 0 otherwise. The coefficients  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$  capture the comovement between the two types of capital flows and output during normal and crises times, respectively.  $X_{i,t}$  represents a set of control variables including the exchange rate regime (which proxies the monetary policy framework) and the Chinn and Ito (2008) index (which captures the degree of capital controls).<sup>3</sup> We include year dummies  $Q_t$  to capture the influence of common aggregate trends.<sup>4</sup> We also include country fixed effects  $I_i$  that captures the effects of economic and political structures and other relevant features that are potentially important for explaining cross-country difference.

Table 1 reports the OLS estimation results for FDI and debt inflows, with standard errors clustered by country reported in parentheses. For both variables, the GDP growth rate is positively associated with inflows, suggesting that better economic conditions attract to foreign inflows in normal times. Moreover, this correlation is much more pronounced in the case of debt inflows. The interactive term, as measured

3. We use the annual fine exchange rate regime classification by Ilzetzi, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2017) for countries in our sample.

4. This may include global economic conditions, global liquidity, the stance of U.S. monetary policy and other factors that do not vary across countries. We have conducted robustness checks using U.S. GDP growth rate, or global liquidity indicator, or U.S. interest rate as the control variable. The results still carry forward.

by the product of GDP growth rate and a crisis dummy, shows the marginal effect of a crisis on the cyclical of capital inflows. We note that this term is positively associated with debt inflows, reflecting strong procyclicality of external debt financing throughout the business cycle, contracting significantly during crises, and recovering during expansions. The behavior of FDI, however, is vastly different from debt around periods of crises. The coefficient of its interactive term is significantly negative, indicating that FDI is very resilient, and moves against the cyclical tendencies during financial stress. These results are robust to controlling for the exchange rate regime, capital control policies, and country fixed effects.

We also report the dynamic cyclical pattern of capital inflows during crises explicitly, which can be captured by the sum of the coefficients on the GDP growth rate and the cross term. Note that the sum of the two coefficients is slightly negative though insignificant. The implications of this result are discussed in more detail next.

During normal times, FDI inflows are procyclical. This is consistent with the results in Ahmed and Zlate (2014) who have shown that domestic growth is a statistically and economically important determinant of private capital inflows. However, facing a financial shock, a deterioration in access to liquidity and a tightening of credit constraints may put a domestic firm in a more attractive position to foreigners. This is the fire-sale argument by Krugman (2000) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2005), which limits the negative impact of a growth slowdown on FDI inflows. In our analysis of emerging market economies during crises, this positive effect generated by financial shocks outweighs the negative impact of a growth slowdown, leading to a drop in the coefficient from positive ( $\beta_1$ ) to negative ( $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ ), implying a fall in the correlation between FDI and output from normal to crises times.<sup>5</sup>

The above analysis shows the importance of financial shocks in driving cross-border capital flows in economic downturns and crises, and how it may help to stabilize inflows into emerging economies. With this in mind, in the next section, we build a small open economy model with financial frictions and MNC-owned firms, which takes into account the fire-sale channel created by a financial shock in an economic crisis.

## 2. MODEL

In this section, we construct a model of small open economy with financial frictions and FDI. The small open economy is populated by homogeneous households, capital producing firms and goods producing firms. The goods producing firms are either owned by domestic households or foreign MNCs. They produce a homogeneous good with capital and labor. Each firm borrows from an imperfect international financial market along the lines of Gertler and Karadi (2011) to finance its purchase of capital and accumulates net worth. When a firm enters it is owned by domestic investors. In

5. Smith and Valderrama (2009) provide a similar empirical study and find that debt is procyclical while FDI is countercyclical. However, they did not distinguish crisis from noncrisis periods.

each period, there is a probability that the firm is acquired by a foreign MNC and becomes an MNC-owned firm. The associated capital inflows are FDI. MNC-owned firms are more productive and face looser borrowing constraints than domestic firms. Because of these, for a given net worth, an MNC-owned firm has a higher valuation than a domestically owned firm. The system is subject to a productivity shock and a financial shock which affect domestic firms' ability to borrow in international financial markets.

2.1 Firms

There is a unit measure of firms  $i \in [0, 1]$ . Some are owned by domestic households and others by foreign MNCs. To avoid confusion, we label a domestic firm with superscript  $d$  and an MNC-owned firm with superscript  $f$ . Firms produce with the following Cobb–Douglas production function:

$$y_{it}^s = A_t^s (k_{it-1}^s)^\alpha (l_{it}^s)^{1-\alpha}, \quad s \in \{d, f\}, \tag{2}$$

where  $A_t^s$  denotes the productivity of type  $s$  firms,  $l_{it}^s$  denotes labor, and  $k_{it-1}^s$  denotes the stock of capital for firm  $i$ .

Following Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) and Alquist, Mukherjee, and Tesar (2016), we assume that MNC-owned firms have higher productivity than domestically owned firms. We assume  $A_t^d = A_t$  and  $A_t^f = \chi A_t$ , where  $\chi \geq 1$  is a reduced-form parameter to capture higher productivity in MNC-owned firms.<sup>6</sup>

In period  $t$ , a firm  $i$  of type  $s$  has net worth  $n_{it}^s$ . It borrows  $b_{it}^{*s}$  from the international financial market at the world interest rate  $R_{t+1}^*$  to finance its purchase of capital  $Q_t k_{it}^s$ , where  $Q_t$  is the price of capital. The firm's balance sheet is given by

$$n_{it}^s + b_{it}^{*s} = Q_t k_{it}^s. \tag{3}$$

After a firm produces, it sells undepreciated capital to capital producing firms and repays the loan with interest. The firm's net worth evolves as follows:

$$n_{it}^s = r_{kt}^s k_{it-1}^s + (1 - \delta) Q_t k_{it-1}^s - R_t^* b_{it-1}^{*s}, \tag{4}$$

where the marginal product of capital of type- $s$  firm  $r_{kt}^s$  is defined as  $r_{kt}^s k_{it-1}^s \equiv \max_{l_{it}^s} \{y_{it}^s - w_t l_{it}^s\}$ .<sup>7</sup> Labor is mobile across domestic and MNC-owned firms, so firms pay the same wage  $w_t$ . We also define the return on capital as

6. We note that the productivity improvement channel is not fully settled empirically. For instance, Williamson (1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that foreign owners may not be able to use domestic assets as efficiently as domestic ones due to asset specificity. In Section 4.1, we conduct a robustness test with the productivity improvement turned off ( $\chi = 1$ ) and show that our qualitative result does not rely on this assumption.

7. This means that

$$l_{it}^s = \left[ \frac{(1 - \alpha) A_t^s}{w_t} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} k_{it-1}^s,$$

$$R_{kt}^s \equiv \frac{r_{kt}^s + (1 - \delta)Q_t}{Q_{t-1}}. \quad (5)$$

Given Cobb–Douglas production technology, the marginal product of capital is common across firms within each firm type. Since domestic firms are less productive than MNC-owned firms, but both types of firms face the same wage, domestically owned firms have a lower return on capital.<sup>8</sup> The optimal choice of labor requires  $w_t l_{it}^s = (1 - \alpha)y_{it}^s$ , and this implies that all firms have the same labor to output ratio.

We now describe the value of MNC-owned firms. After production takes place, in period  $t + 1$ , there is an exogenous probability  $(1 - \kappa)$  that an MNC exits.<sup>9</sup> The MNC takes the net worth of the firm and leaves the small open economy. The firm faces financial frictions that make its risk-adjusted return greater than the world interest rate, so it will keep accumulating assets until it leaves the industry. The firm maximizes its expected terminal wealth, given by

$$V_{it}^f = \max_{k_{it}^f, b_{it}^{*f}} E_t \left\{ \Lambda_{t,t+1}^* \left[ (1 - \kappa)n_{it+1}^f + \kappa V_{it+1}^f \right] \right\}, \quad (6)$$

where  $\Lambda_{t,t+1}^* = 1/R_{t+1}^*$  denotes the stochastic discount factor of the foreign investors.

The value function of a domestic firm can be expressed similarly. Assume a domestic firm exits in the beginning of period  $t + 1$  with an exogenous probability  $(1 - \sigma)$ . If it exits, the net worth is transferred back to households. If it does not exit, there is an exogenous probability  $\Theta$  that it is acquired by a foreign MNC.<sup>10,11</sup> In this case, the MNC acquires the domestic firm at a Nash-bargained price  $V_{it+1}^{nash}$  and this value is transferred back to domestic households who own equities of the domestic firm. With probability  $\sigma(1 - \Theta)$  the firm continues to operate as a domestic firm. The value of the firm is given by

$$V_{it}^d = \max_{k_{it}^d, b_{it}^{*d}} E_t \left\{ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left[ (1 - \sigma)n_{it+1}^d + \sigma \left[ \Theta V_{it+1}^{nash} + (1 - \Theta)V_{it+1}^d \right] \right] \right\}, \quad (7)$$

where  $\Lambda_{t,t+1}$  is the stochastic discount factor of domestic households.

Domestic firms and MNC-owned firms alike are subject to financial frictions. We assume financial frictions following Gertler and Karadi (2011). Specifically, after a

$$r_{kt}^s k_{it-1}^s = \alpha A_t^s \left[ \frac{(1 - \alpha)A_t^s}{w_t} \right]^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} k_{it-1}^s.$$

8. Easy to show that if  $\chi > 1$ ,  $r_{kt}^f = \chi^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} r_{kt}^d > r_{kt}^d$ , and  $R_{kt}^f > R_{kt}^d$ .

9. Following Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), and Gertler and Karadi (2011), this assumption prevents firms from growing out of their financial constraints.

10. In the benchmark model, we abstract from time-varying acquisition probability  $\Theta$ . Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) and Alquist, Mukherjee, and Tesar (2016), however, find that the acquisition probability increases during financial crises. In the extended model, we allow for time-varying acquisition probability and show that our main results are qualitatively unchanged.

11. We also consider a version of the model that allows foreign MNCs to raise equity in the international financial market and then invest the proceed as portfolio equity inflow to the emerging market. This channel does not change our results qualitatively. Details are available from the authors.



firm borrows from the international market, the firm manager has an option to divert a fraction of funds from the firm. If this happens, the firm will shut down. A firm manager has an incentive to divert funds when the continuing value of the firm is less than the value of divertible capital. International lenders restrict their lending so that no firm managers divert funds in equilibrium. The incentive constraints for the lenders to MNC-owned firms and domestic firms are, respectively,

$$V_{it}^f \geq \theta^f Q_t k_{it}^f, \quad V_{it}^d \geq \theta_t^d Q_t k_{it}^d, \quad (8)$$

where  $\theta^f$  and  $\theta_t^d$  represent the fraction of asset that each type of firm is able to divert.

We make two assumptions about the fraction of divertible assets. First, we assume that the fraction of divertible funds for the domestic firms,  $\theta_t^d$ , follows an exogenous process, generating changes in firms' borrowing capacities. Jermann and Quadrini (2012) show that changes in credit conditions can strongly influence the dynamics of financial flows as well as the real business cycle, leading to economic downturns and financial crises. Therefore, we model a financial crisis as an exogenous positive shock in  $\theta_t^d$ . This shock raises the fraction of divertible assets for domestically owned firms, which tightens the financial constraint and reduces international lending to domestically owned firms.<sup>12</sup> Following Aguiar and Gopinath (2005), we assume that the fraction of funds divertible by MNCs,  $\theta^f$ , is not affected. Because foreign MNCs are mainly from advanced economies, they can make their own line of financing available through other channels. Second, we assume that domestic firms face tighter incentive constraints than MNC-owned firms, reflecting their poorer access to international financial markets. This means that  $\theta_t^d > \theta^f$ .<sup>13</sup>

When an acquisition takes place, the MNC and domestic investors negotiate the acquisition price by splitting the surplus,  $V_{it}^f - V_{it}^d$ , via Nash bargaining. The match value  $V_{it}^{nash}$  is then given by<sup>14</sup>

$$V_{it}^{nash} = \xi \left( V_{it}^f - V_{it}^d \right) + V_{it}^d, \quad (9)$$

where  $\xi$  is the domestic firm's relative bargaining power.

To sum up, domestic and MNC-owned firms maximize their value functions (7) and (6), respectively, subject to their balance sheets (3), evolution of net worth (4), the respective incentive constraints (8), and the Nash-bargaining condition (9), taking prices and transition probabilities as given. We focus on the case in which both incentive constraints in (8) are binding. Because the value functions, balance sheets and the incentive constraints are all constant returns to scale, and because the Nash-bargaining solution is also linear in the values of domestically owned and

12. There are several interpretation of an increase in  $\theta_t^d$ . It may reflect (in reduced form) the worsening in the perception of international lenders the debt repayment ability of the firms, or a reduced value of implicit government guarantees, or worsening fundamentals lead to multiple equilibria in which firms have high default probability in the bad equilibrium.

13. Our calibration ensures that  $\theta_t^d > \theta^f$  is satisfied for more than 99% of times.

14. We will make explicit why a valuation gap exists later.

MNC-owned firms, we conjecture that for each type of firm  $s \in \{d, f\}$ , the value of a firm is proportional to its net worth. Precisely, we define  $\psi_{it}^s$  as the marginal value per unit net worth:

$$\psi_{it}^s \equiv \frac{V_{it}^s}{n_{it}^s}, \quad \text{for } s \in \{d, f\}, \tag{10}$$

and conjecture that  $\psi_{it}^s = \psi_t^s$  for  $s \in \{d, f\}$ . Then, using equation (9), the Nash-bargained price per unit net worth can be expressed as a weighted average of domestic and MNC's valuation of a unit of net worth:

$$\frac{V_{it}^{nash}}{n_{it}^d} \equiv \psi_t^{nash} = \xi \psi_t^f + (1 - \xi) \psi_t^d. \tag{11}$$

Binding incentive constraints (8) mean that all firms within each type  $s$  choose the same leverage  $\phi_t^s \equiv Q_t k_{it}^s / n_{it}^s$ , given by

$$\psi_t^f = \theta^f \phi_t^f, \quad \psi_t^d = \theta^d \phi_t^d. \tag{12}$$

By dividing the value functions by firms' net worth and substituting in the evolution of capital, one can show that the marginal values of net worth are given by

$$\psi_t^s = \mu_t^s \phi_t^s + v_t^s, \quad \text{for } s \in \{d, f\}, \tag{13}$$

where  $\mu_t^f, v_t^f, \mu_t^d$ , and  $v_t^d$  are given by

$$\mu_t^f \equiv E_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1}^* \Omega_{t+1}^* (R_{kt+1}^f - R_{t+1}^*) \right], \tag{14}$$

$$v_t^f \equiv E_t (\Lambda_{t,t+1}^* \Omega_{t+1}^* R_{t+1}^*), \tag{15}$$

$$\mu_t^d \equiv E_t [\Lambda_{t,t+1} \Omega_{t+1} (R_{kt+1}^d - R_{t+1}^*)], \tag{16}$$

$$v_t^d \equiv E_t (\Lambda_{t,t+1} \Omega_{t+1} R_{t+1}^*), \tag{17}$$

and

$$\Omega_{t+1}^* \equiv (1 - \kappa) + \kappa \psi_{t+1}^f, \tag{18}$$

$$\Omega_{t+1} \equiv (1 - \sigma) + \sigma \Theta \psi_{t+1}^{nash} + \sigma (1 - \Theta) \psi_{t+1}^d. \tag{19}$$

Here,  $\Omega_{t+1}^*$  is the marginal value of net worth of MNC-owned firms in period  $t + 1$ , which is the weighted average values of separating and continuing firms. Similarly,  $\Omega_{t+1}$  is the marginal value of net worth of domestically owned firms in period  $t + 1$ . It is the weighted average of the values of exiting, matching with an MNC and continuing to operating as a domestically owned firm. We define  $\Lambda_{t,t+1}^* \Omega_{t+1}^*$  and  $\Lambda_{t,t+1} \Omega_{t+1}$  as the “augmented stochastic discount factor” for MNC-owned and domestic firms. Equations (15) and (17) state that the marginal value of net worth,  $v_t^s$ , is the expected product of the augmented stochastic discount factor and the world interest rate  $R_{t+1}^*$ . Equations (14) and (16) state that the excess marginal value of capital,  $\mu_t^s$ , is the expected product of the augmented stochastic discount factor and the excess return ( $R_{kt+1}^s - R_{t+1}^*$ ).

Finally, the incentive constraints can be rearranged to solve for the leverages:

$$\phi_t^f = \frac{v_t^f}{\theta^f - \mu_t^f}, \quad \phi_t^d = \frac{v_t^d}{\theta_t^d - \mu_t^d}. \quad (20)$$

To make sure the constraints (8) are binding, we require that (1)  $\theta^f > \mu_t^f$ , (2)  $\theta_t^d > \mu_t^d$ , (3)  $\psi_t^d > 1$ , and (4)  $\psi_t^f > 1$ . The first two inequalities ensure that at high enough leverage, firms have an incentive to divert funds. The last two inequalities ensure that it is always profitable for firms to continue to operate. We check that these constraints are satisfied around the nonstochastic steady state when we solve the model numerically.

To understand why domestic investors and foreign MNC value domestic firms differently, we combine equations (13)–(17) to get

$$\psi_t^f = E_t \left\{ \Lambda_{t,t+1}^* \Omega_{t+1}^* \left[ (R_{kt+1}^f - R_{t+1}^*) \phi_{t+1}^f + R_{t+1}^* \right] \right\}, \quad (21)$$

$$\psi_t^d = E_t \left\{ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \Omega_{t+1} \left[ (R_{kt+1}^d - R_{t+1}^*) \phi_{t+1}^d + R_{t+1}^* \right] \right\}. \quad (22)$$

These values are different for four reasons. First, MNC brings about technology spillovers, so  $R_{kt}^f > R_{kt}^d$ . Second, an MNC-owned firm faces looser financial constraints than domestic firms  $\theta^f < \theta_t^d$ . So for a given amount of net worth, an MNC-owned firm can borrow more and have higher leverage, that is,  $\phi_{t+1}^f > \phi_{t+1}^d$ . Third, domestic households do not have access to international financial markets, and they discount more heavily than foreign MNCs. These three effects increase an MNC’s valuation of a domestic firm relative to domestic investors’ valuation. Finally, the survival rate of MNC firms,  $\sigma$  may be lower than that of the domestic firms  $\kappa$ . The calibration of the model is such that  $\psi_t^f$  is bigger than  $\psi_t$  around the steady state, so the foreign MNC is always willing to buy a domestic firm.

## 2.2 Capital Goods Producers

Capital goods producers are standard. At the end of each period, domestically owned and MNC-owned firms sell undepreciated capital to competitive capital goods producers owned by domestic households. A representative capital good producer buys previously installed capital and combines with investment good  $I_t$  from final goods producers to produce new capital. Newly produced capital is sold back to the firms within the same period. Production of new capital is subject to convex investment adjustment costs. The evolution of capital is given by

$$K_t = (1 - \delta)K_{t-1} + (1 - Adj_t)I_t, \quad (23)$$

where  $Adj_t = 0.5\Psi^I(I_t/I_{t-1} - 1)^2$  are investment adjustment costs. Capital goods producers maximize discounted sum of expected future profits,  $E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \Lambda_{t,t+s} \Pi_{t+s}^K$ , where  $\Pi_t^K = Q_t[K_t - (1 - \delta)K_{t-1}] - I_t$ . The first-order condition for the optimal investment choice is

$$1 = Q_t \left[ 1 - Adj_t - \Psi^I \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} \left( \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} - 1 \right) \right] + E_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} Q_{t+1} \Psi^I \left( \frac{I_{t+1}}{I_t} \right)^2 \left( \frac{I_{t+1}}{I_t} - 1 \right) \right]. \quad (24)$$

## 2.3 Domestic Households

An infinite-lived representative household in the small open economy consumes and supplies labor. The representative household's preferences are given by

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \ln \left( C_t - \Psi^L \frac{L_t^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi} \right). \quad (25)$$

We use Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988) (GHH) preferences. It is well known that the utility can generate a labor supply schedule that only depends on the real wage. Moreover, Correia, Neves, and Rebelo (1995) and Raffo (2008) show that GHH preferences are better suited to match the second moments of open economies.

In each period, the representative household receives wage income, returns from holding domestic bonds  $D_t^d$ , and equities of domestic firms  $s_{it}$ , and profits from capital producing firms  $\Pi_t^K$ . The household consumes, adjusts its asset portfolio, and pays start-up funds to new domestically owned firms, denoted as  $tr_t$ . To sum up, a representative household faces the following budget constraint:

$$w_t L_t + R_t^d D_{t-1}^d + \int_i s_{it-1} [(1 - \sigma)n_{it}^d + \sigma \Theta V_{it}^{nash} + \sigma(1 - \Theta)V_{it}^d] di + \Pi_t^K = C_t + \int_i s_{it} V_{it}^d di + D_t^d + tr_t. \quad (26)$$

The intratemporal labor supply conditions are given by the following:

$$w_t = \Psi^L L_t^\varphi. \tag{27}$$

The following consumption Euler equation helps us pin down the domestic interest rate:

$$1 = E_t(\Lambda_{t,t+1} R_{t+1}^d), \tag{28}$$

where the stochastic discount factor is given by  $\Lambda_{t-1,t} = \beta U_{C,t} / U_{C,t-1}$ . The optimal choice for equity turns out to be a restatement of the solved-out value function of domestic firms.<sup>15</sup>

#### 2.4 Aggregation and Market Clearing

Since each type of firms have the same capital to labor ratio and leverage ratio, we only need to keep track of the sector level quantities. For  $Z \in \{Y, K, L, N, B^*\}$ , we define  $Z_t^d \equiv \int_i z_{it}^d di$ ,  $Z_t^f \equiv \int_i z_{it}^f di$ , and we also define economy-wide variables such that  $Z_t \equiv Z_t^f + Z_t^d$ .

The aggregate balance sheets of the domestically owned firms and MNC-owned firms are given by

$$B_t^{*s} \equiv Q_t K_t^s - N_t^s, \quad \text{for } s \in \{d, f\}. \tag{29}$$

Next, we derive the law of motion of the net worth of MNC-owned and domestically owned firms. In each period, a fraction  $(1 - \sigma)$  of domestically owned firms exits the market. To make the number of firms in the economy constant, we assume that an equal measure of new domestic firms enters, with start-up funds transferred from domestic households. In sum, the net worth of domestic firms evolves as follows:

$$N_t^d = \sigma(1 - \Theta)[(R_{kt}^d - R_t^*)\phi_{t-1}^d + R_t^*]N_{t-1}^d + \omega Q_t K_{t-1}^d, \tag{30}$$

where  $\omega Q_t K_{t-1}^d$  is the start-up fund.

For MNC-owned firms, matches dissolve with an exogenous separation rate  $(1 - \kappa)$ . When a multinational separates from a local firm, it takes the net worth. The net

15. The Euler equation for equity is given by

$$V_{it}^d = E_t(\Lambda_{t,t+1} [(1 - \sigma)n_{it+1}^d + \sigma \Theta V_{it+1}^{nash} + \sigma(1 - \Theta)V_{it+1}^d]).$$

We divide the above equation by  $n_{it}^d$ , and get  $\psi_{it}^d = \psi_{it}^d = E_t\{\Lambda_{t,t+1}\Omega_{t+1}[(R_{kt+1}^d - R_{t+1}^*)\phi_t^d + R_{t+1}^*]\} = \mu_{it}^d \phi_t^d + v_t^d$ , which is the same as equation (13).

worth of firms owned by foreign MNCs evolves as follows:

$$N_t^f = \kappa \left[ (R_{kt}^f - R_t^*) \phi_{t-1}^f + R_t^* \right] N_{t-1}^f + \sigma \Theta \left[ (R_{kt}^d - R_t^*) \phi_{t-1}^d + R_t^* \right] N_{t-1}^d. \quad (31)$$

The first term on the right-hand side refers to MNC-owned firms that survive after period  $t - 1$  and the second term refers to the firms newly acquired by MNCs in period  $t$ .

Appendix B shows that the resource constraint in this economy can be expressed as the following balance of payment equation:

$$\underbrace{Y_t - C_t - I_t}_{\text{net exports}} = \underbrace{(1 - \kappa) [R_{kt}^f Q_{t-1} K_{t-1}^f - R_t^* B_{t-1}^{*f}] - \sigma \Theta V_t^{\text{nash}}}_{\text{equity financing}} + \underbrace{R_t^* B_{t-1}^* - B_t^*}_{\text{debt financing}}. \quad (32)$$

The left-hand side of this equation is net exports; the right-hand side is the capital account, which comprises FDI (equity) financing and debt financing. Finally, asset markets clear, which means that  $D_t^d = 0$  and  $s_{it} = 1$ , for all  $i$ .

### 2.5 Shock Processes

We assume three exogenous shocks in this system, namely, a Total Factor Productivity (TFP) shock, a world interest rate shock and a shock to the financial constraint facing domestic firms. We assume that these shocks follow exogenous AR(1) processes as follows:

$$\ln A_t = \rho_A \ln A_{t-1} + \epsilon_{At}, \quad \epsilon_{At} \sim N(0, \sigma_A^2), \quad (33)$$

$$\ln R_t^* = (1 - \rho_{R^*}) \ln \bar{R}^* + \rho_{R^*} \ln R_{t-1}^* + \epsilon_{R^*t}, \quad \epsilon_{R^*t} \sim N(0, \sigma_{R^*}^2), \quad (34)$$

$$\ln \theta_t^d = (1 - \rho_\theta) \ln \bar{\theta}^d + \rho_\theta \ln \theta_{t-1}^d + \epsilon_{\theta t}, \quad \epsilon_{\theta t} \sim N(0, \sigma_\theta^2), \quad (35)$$

where we use an upper bar to denote the steady state of a variable. The innovations of all shocks are assumed to be i.i.d, uncorrelated over time and with each other.

This completes the description of the model. Appendix A shows the equations in the full system.

## 3. CALIBRATION

In the following we solve and simulate the model numerically. The model is solved using log-linear approximation of the system around its nonstochastic steady state.

TABLE 2  
CALIBRATED PARAMETERS

Parameter	Value	Meaning
$\beta$	0.985	Subjective discount factor
$\alpha$	0.33	Capital share in production
$\delta$	0.025	Capital depreciation rate
$\Psi^L$	5	Labor disutility
$\phi$	1	Inverse of Frisch labor elasticity
$\Psi^I$	1	Convexity of investment adjustment costs
$R^*$	$1.04^{1/4}$	World interest rate
$\kappa$	0.921	MNC-owned firm survival rate
$\sigma$	0.96	Domestic firm survival rate
$\xi$	0.3	Domestic firm bargaining weight
$\chi$	$1.1^\alpha$	Technology spillovers by MNC
$\theta^d$	0.71	Fraction of divertible assets, domestic firms
$\theta^f$	0.56	Fraction of divertible assets, MNC-owned firms
$\omega$	0.0123	Start-up funds for domestic firms
$\Theta$	0.002	MNC acquisition probability
$\rho_A$	0.95	Persistence of productivity shock
$\rho_{R^*}$	0.95	Persistence of world interest rate shock
$\rho_\theta$	0.98	Persistence of financial shock
$\sigma_A$	0.0027	Std. of productivity shock innovation
$\sigma_{R^*}$	0.001	Std. of world interest rate innovation
$\sigma_\theta$	0.02	Std. of financial shock innovation

This section discusses our calibrations to match the model with emerging economies' business cycles.

Each period is a quarter. Parameters in production and household sectors are relatively standard in the macroeconomic literature. These are given in Table 2. We set  $\beta = 0.985$ , which generates a steady-state annualized interest rate around 6%. We set  $\Psi^L = 5.0$ , so that households devote 37% of their time to work. The parameter that governs the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is set to  $\phi = 1.0$ . For production, the capital share is set to  $\alpha = 0.33$ , and the depreciation rate is set to  $\delta = 0.025$ . The curvature of investment adjustment costs  $\Psi^I$  is set to 1. Lastly, we set the world interest rate to  $R^* = 1.04^{1/4}$ .

We calibrate nonstandard parameters in the model as follows. We set  $\sigma = 0.96$  which implies that a domestic firm is expected to survive for about 6 years.<sup>16</sup> We follow Smith and Valderrama (2009) to set the MNC-owned firm survival probability to  $\kappa = 0.921$ . That MNC-owned firms are more likely to quit is consistent with empirical evidence (see, e.g., Aguiar and Gopinath 2005, Ferragina, Pittiglio, and Reganati 2009, Ibarra-Caton 2012). We set moderate technology spillovers by MNC to  $\chi = 1.1^\alpha$ , so that the return on capital by MNC-owned firms is higher than that of domestically owned firms. We set the relative bargaining weight of domestic firm to  $\xi = 0.3$ . We conduct sensitivity analysis with other values for these parameters.

16. Morris (2009) estimates that U.S. firms have average life expectancies of 7–11 years.

We calibrate the credit contract parameters to match four steady-state targets. First, we set the steady-state leverage of domestic firms to  $\phi^d = 1.7$ . Second, the steady-state external finance premium for domestic firm is set to  $R_k^d/R^* = 1.007$ . These two values come from the emerging market data set in Fernández and Gulán (2015). Third, we set the stock of FDI liability to GDP ratio to  $V^f/(4Y) = 9\%$ . This is the average of the stock of FDI liability to GDP ratio in our sample countries in 1980–2007, according to the External Wealth of Nations data set (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007).<sup>17</sup> Fourth, the fraction of capital owned by domestic firms is set to  $K^d/K = 0.92$ . This fraction is consistent with Smith and Valderrama (2009) and Mendoza and Smith (2006). These targets identify  $\theta^f$ ,  $\bar{\theta}^d$ ,  $\Theta$ , and the steady-state MNC-owned firm leverage  $\phi^f$  uniquely. See Appendix C for details of the identification of these parameters.

These steady-state conditions imply  $\theta^f = 0.56$  and  $\bar{\theta}^d = 0.71$ . Importantly,  $\theta^f < \bar{\theta}^d$ , which implies that domestic firms face tighter financial constraints than MNC-owned firms. The steady-state leverage ratio of MNC-owned firms is  $\bar{\phi}^f = 3.1$ , which is larger than that of domestic owned firms, reflecting the fact that MNC-owned firms face looser financial conditions. In the steady state,  $\bar{\psi}^f = 1.73 > \bar{\psi} = 1.20$ , which suggests that foreign multinationals indeed have an incentive to acquire domestic firms. Furthermore, we obtain  $\Theta = 0.002$ , which implies that 0.8% of domestic firms gets acquired in a year, or an FDI to output ratio of 1.1%. The start-up fund parameter  $\omega$  is set to 0.012.

We calibrate the shock processes following Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Perri's (2013) strategy. Precisely, we assume that the financial shock is turned off in normal times so that there are only productivity and world interest rate shocks in normal times. We rely on output data in crisis and noncrises times to back out the remaining shock processes. For the interest rate shock, we obtain expected 3-month real interest rate data (including country spreads) for all emerging economies in our sample except Indonesia.<sup>18</sup> For each country, we fit an AR(1) process to the interest rate data. The average shock persistence and standard deviation of the innovation are 0.95 and 0.001, respectively.

To calibrate the remaining shocks, we follow Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011) and Mendoza (1991) to set  $\rho_A = 0.95$ . We use HP-filtered (Hodrick and Prescott 1997) quarterly log-output data in 1990q1–2012q3 for all emerging economies in our

17. We find from the same data set by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) that the external debt liability to annual GDP ratio in Korea, Philippines, and Thailand are 1980–2007 are 32%, 64%, and 44%, respectively, whereas the same steady-state ratio implied by our baseline model is 85%. One key reason is that firms in our model cannot borrow domestically. Later, we will discuss an extended model that allows for domestic loans together with external debt and in that model we can match the observed external borrowing to GDP ratio.

18. The country spread data for Indonesia are not available. The interest rate data are constructed following Neumeier and Perri (2005). We use secondary market prices of emerging market bonds to recover nominal U.S. dollar interest rates and subtract expected inflation to get U.S. real interest rate. The country spread data are retrieved from EMBI Global spread database and U.S. risk-free interest data are proxied by 3-month T-bill rate. Expected inflation is computed as the average U.S. consumer price index inflation in the current quarter and in the three preceding quarters (both T-bill rate and CPI data available from the St. Louis Federal Reserve FRED database).



sample, and split the sample according to crisis and noncrisis periods. We find that the output volatility is around 2.54% in noncrisis periods, and 3.27% in crisis periods. These numbers accord well with the existing literature on emerging economies' business cycles (see, e.g., Aguiar and Gopinath 2007). We then calibrate the standard deviation of productivity innovation to  $\sigma_A = 0.0027$  to get the required output volatility in noncrisis periods.<sup>19</sup> We set  $\rho_\theta = 0.98$ ,  $\sigma_\theta = 0.02$  to match the output volatility in crisis periods.

#### 4. MODEL PROPERTIES

This section discusses the mechanism and simulation results of our model. We proceed as follows. First, we report the impulse responses when the model is hit by productivity shocks, world interest rate shocks and financial shocks, respectively. Next, we compute simulated moments and compare them with the data. We show that the model-generated moments match the stylized facts fairly well.

##### 4.1 Impulse Responses

Figures 1 and 3 show the responses of key macro and financial variables to one standard deviation adverse productivity and financial shocks, respectively. In both cases, the economy starts from the steady state and is hit by one of the shocks at time 0. All variables are expressed in their percentage deviations from the steady state.

In Figure 1, a negative productivity shock leads to a sharp fall in the realized return on capital for both domestically owned firms and MNC-owned firms. The net worth of both sectors falls, which further depresses investment demand via a financial accelerator mechanism as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). The fall in net worth reduces equity prices  $V_t^d$  for domestic firms initially. With impaired balance sheets, total international lending to the small open economy  $B_t^*$  falls.

The total value of FDI inflows ( $FDI_t = \sigma \Theta \psi_t^{nash} N_t^d$ ) is affected by a quantity effect and price effect, which work in opposite directions. The quantity effect refers to the fact that acquired firms have a smaller net worth on average after a negative shock. The price effect refers to a rise in  $\psi_t^{nash}$ , the Nash-bargained acquisition value per unit of net worth. With a sharp fall in investment the expected future return on capital increases, which raises the expected return on capital and value per unit of net worth for both types of firm. This effect is more pronounced for MNC-owned firms because they face looser financial constraints and are able to borrow with higher leverage. As a result, the valuation gap per unit of net worth ( $\psi_t^f - \psi_t^d$ ) widens. As  $\psi_t^f$  rises by more than  $\psi_t^d$ , the Nash-bargained acquisition price  $\psi_t^{nash}$  also rises by more than  $\psi_t^d$ . In our calibrated model, the quantity effect dominates when the

19. The standard deviation for the innovation process of TFP is smaller than what is found in other work, such as Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011) and Neumeyer and Perri (2005) for two reasons. First, financial frictions in our model amplifies shocks. Second, we exclude the crisis periods when we calibrate the productivity shock and attribute increased volatility during crises to financial shocks.




FIG. 1. Impulse response to a negative productivity shock.

NOTE: The impulse response functions measure the response to a one standard deviation negative shock to the innovations of TFP as the percent deviation from the steady state. The series are simulated based on the benchmark calibration.

system is hit by a productivity shock and FDI inflows fall. Therefore, there is positive comovement between international debt and FDI inflow.

Figure 2 shows the impulse response to a positive world interest rate shock  $R_t^*$  to the small open economy. The recent literature shows that world interest rate shock may explain a nonnegligible fraction of emerging economies' business cycles (see, e.g., Neumeyer and Perri 2005, Uribe and Yue 2006). A rise in the world interest rate increases the cost of borrowing for both domestic and MNC-owned firms, leading to capital outflows and a fall in investment. A drop in  $Q_t$  reduces firm's net worth. As in the case of a productivity shock, a fall in firm's net worth reduces the average size of foreign acquisition. This effect dominates the price effect, that is, a rise in the acquisition price per unit net worth of domestic firm. As a result, FDI inflow falls. Therefore, the world interest rate shock, likewise, cannot generate negative comovement between output and FDI inflows.

Figure 3 shows the impulse responses to an adverse financial shock  $\theta_t$ . Recall that a negative financial shock is an unexpected rise in the fraction of divertible assets in the domestic firm sector. As MNC-owned firms have access to international financial markets via MNCs, the fraction of divertible assets in MNC-owned firm sector is not affected.




Fig. 2. Impulse response to a positive world interest rate shock.

NOTES: The impulse response functions measure the response to a one standard deviation positive shock to the innovations of world interest rate as the percent deviation from the steady state.

In response to a tightening of financial constraints, domestic firms borrow less in international financial markets, so  $B_t^*$  falls. A fall in leverage in domestic firms reduces investment demand and decreases the price of capital  $Q_t$ , which reduces the value of capital in both types of firms. As a result, net worth in both sectors drops and the expected future return on capital increases. Contrary to a productivity shock, a financial shock only directly affects domestic firms, which tightens their financial constraints but that is not the case for MNC-owned firms, so an increase in leverage happens disproportionately in MNC-owned firms. The valuation gap per unit of net worth ( $\psi_t^f - \psi_t^d$ ) between MNC-owned firms and domestic firms increases sharply, and so is the acquisition price per unit of net worth  $\psi_t^{\text{dash}}$ . With a strong price effect, FDI inflows turn positive after a financial shock, leading to a negative comovement between international debt and FDI inflows.

Clearly, the relative sizes of the price and quantity effects depend on our calibration. However, the key result that FDI inflows increase after a bad financial shock is fairly robust. Figure 4 shows the sensitivity of the impulse responses of FDI inflow under different assumptions. For instance, when there is no knowledge spillover and when  $f$  firms have low survival probability, the valuation gap between MNCs and domestic




FIG. 3. Impulse response to an adverse financial shock.

NOTES: The impulse response functions measure the response to a one standard deviation positive shock to the innovations of the credit constraint as the percent deviation from the steady state. The series are simulated based on the benchmark calibration.

investors narrows. This tends to weaken the price effect. For the same reason, when domestic investors' bargaining power  $\xi$  is low,  $\psi_t^{dash}$  is low, which also limits the price effect. Under these circumstances, the response of FDI is less positive relative to the benchmark case. On the other hand, if the domestic interest rate is high relative to the world interest rate, the difference in discounting increases the valuation gap between MNCs and domestic investors, which strengthens the price effect. Overall, Figure 4 shows that FDI inflows turn positive one quarter after a crisis shock in all these alternative scenarios.

Moreover, this model mechanism is supported by our empirical data. Recall that the ratio between FDI inflow and domestic firm value can be written as

$$\frac{\text{FDI inflow}_t}{V_t^d} = \frac{\sigma \Theta \psi_t^{dash} N_t^d}{V_t^d} = \frac{\sigma \Theta \psi_t^{dash}}{\psi_t^d}.$$

Following a financial shock, the valuation gap increases, which means that the ratio  $\psi_t^{dash} / \psi_t^d$  should increase in crisis times. We compute this ratio for a number of emerging markets in our sample shown in Table 3. For each country, we use market capitalization as a proxy of firm value and then compute the FDI inflows to market




FIG. 4. Impulse response of FDI inflow to an adverse financial shock under alternative assumptions.

NOTES: The impulse response functions measure the response to a one standard deviation positive shock to the innovations of the credit constraint as the percent deviation from the steady state. No knowledge spillover:  $\chi = 1$ . High domestic interest rate:  $\beta = 0.98$ . Low  $d$  firm bargaining power:  $\xi = 0.2$ . Low  $f$  firm survival:  $\kappa = 0.9$ .

TABLE 3  
FDI INFLOWS NORMALIZED BY STOCK MARKET CAPITALIZATION

	$t - 3$	$t - 2$	$t - 1$	$t$	$t + 1$	$t + 2$	$t + 3$
Korea	0.6	1.4	2.0	7.9 <sup>a</sup>	5.2	3.5	6.7
Malaysia	2.5	2.7	2.4	6.8 <sup>a</sup>	2.8	2.8	3.4
Mexico	4.1	3.2	2.2	8.4	10.5 <sup>a</sup>	8.6	8.2
Thailand	1.1	1.5	2.4	17.0	21.9 <sup>a</sup>	10.7	11.7
Turkey	1.3	2.8	0.7	1.4	6.9 <sup>a</sup>	3.0	2.5

NOTE: Numbers are in percentage.  $t$  represents the year of onset of a crisis, specified by Broner et al. (2013).  $t - i$  represents  $i$ th year before crisis.  $t + i$  represents  $i$ th year after crisis. Simple average of the ratios are reported when a country experiences two or more crises. An "a" denotes the year with the highest ratio.

capitalization from 3 years before a crisis to 3 years after the crisis. We report the simple average of the ratios when a country experiences two or more crises. The table shows that the ratio is relatively low before a crisis. It jumps up and peaks around the time of the crisis. This finding supports our model mechanism that the valuation gap between domestic investors and foreign MNCs widen substantially during a crisis such that FDI inflows turn positive consequently.

TABLE 4  
BUSINESS CYCLE STATISTICS

	Emerging economies		Benchmark model		Extended model	
	(1) Normal	(2) Crisis	(3) Normal	(4) Crisis	(5) Normal	(6) Crisis
$\rho(Y, \text{FDI})$	0.22	-0.10	0.70	-0.06	0.45	-0.28
$\rho(Y, \text{Debt})$	0.22	0.20	0.87	0.81	0.67	0.61
$\sigma_Y$ (%)	2.54	3.27	2.56	3.27	2.58	3.07
$\sigma_C/\sigma_Y$	1.06	1.37	1.09	1.19	1.03	0.94
$\sigma_I/\sigma_Y$	3.76	4.69	3.53	4.63	2.95	3.67

NOTE: Moments of emerging economies are computed using quarterly data from 1990q1 to 2012q3. The numbers from the model are the averages of 100 series of 2100 periods simulated based on the benchmark calibration.  $\sigma_Y$  denotes the standard deviation of GDP (in percentage).  $\sigma_C/\sigma_Y$  represents the standard deviation relative to that of GDP.  $\rho(Y, i)$  is the correlation with GDP.  
SOURCE: International Financial Statistics (IFS).

#### 4.2 Simulated Moments

Next, we compare simulated moments in our model with emerging market economy data in Table 4. The first two columns show the key empirical moments in emerging economies. Since the model has quarterly frequency, we recalculate the empirical second moments with quarterly data in our sample emerging economies.<sup>20</sup> The finding is similar to what we obtained in Section 1 using annual data. In particular, the first two rows show that, FDI and debt are both procyclical in normal times, but the correlation between FDI and output falls substantially during crises and becomes slightly negative.

Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 report the simulated moments of the model with productivity and world interest rate shocks in normal times and with additional financial shocks in crises times. The first row shows that the model generates a positive correlation between output and FDI in normal times. During crises, however, the correlation drops to  $-0.06$ . The second row shows that the correlation between output and debt is positive throughout the business cycle. These patterns are broadly consistent with our empirical findings.

The model also performs reasonably well in terms of matching the volatility of consumption and investment. Given our calibration strategy our model matches the high volatility of output. As in the data, consumption in the model is more volatile than output in both normal and crisis times. Moreover, as the balance of payments identity requires both consumption and investment to fall substantially in crisis times, the model also captures the increase in relative volatility of consumption and investment from normal to crisis times.

There are some discrepancies between the model-simulated moments and those observed in the data. In particular, output correlations with FDI and debt in normal times are higher than the empirical counterparts. As discussed above, the high  $\rho(Y, \text{FDI})$

20. Countries included are Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey. Due to data availability, we exclude Indonesia and Peru.

in normal times is due to a large drop in net worth facing a negative productivity shock, and the quantity effect dominates the price effect such that FDI is strongly procyclical. The high  $\rho(Y, Debt)$  is a result of the financial accelerator mechanism through which a fall in firms' net worth reduces their borrowing capacity as well as their output. In the next section, we consider two simple and realistic extensions to the model which help us better match the comovements of capital flows to the data.

### 5. EXTENDED MODEL

The extended model introduces two additional features. First, there is a time-varying matching probability between MNCs and domestically owned firms. We assume that there is more matching and acquisition when the surplus of acquisition is higher. One interpretation is that foreign MNCs put in more efforts in searching for firms to acquire when surplus is high. Second, we introduce an endogenous portfolio choice problem by the firms that choose between domestic borrowing and international borrowing following Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2016). By doing so, we also introduce a real exchange rate channel. Erel, Liao, and Weisbach (2012) provide empirical evidence that the exchange rate of the host country tends to depreciate before an acquisition. In equilibrium, due to financial frictions, firms borrow both domestically and internationally. We will show that the first feature helps us reduce  $\rho(Y, FDI)$ , and the second feature reduces  $\rho(Y, Debt)$ . In what follows, we sketch the structure of the model and leave the details in Appendix D.

We start by introducing time-varying matching probability. We assume that the matching probability increases when the valuation gap widens, so the number of foreign acquisitions varies over the business cycle<sup>21</sup>:

$$\ln \left( \frac{\Theta_t}{\bar{\Theta}} \right) = \Upsilon \ln \left[ \frac{(\psi_t^f - \psi_t^d) N_t^d}{(\bar{\psi}^f - \bar{\psi}^d) \bar{N}^d} \right]. \tag{36}$$

This way, we introduce an extensive margin of FDI inflow. From Figures 1 and 3, we see that the surplus increases strongly when the economy is hit by a negative productivity shock and a financial shock. Therefore, this extensive margin channel reinforces the price effect of FDI in both good times and crisis times. This is why it helps reduce  $\rho(Y, FDI)$ .

We make a number of changes to the model to allow for the real exchange rate channel and an endogenous portfolio choice problem. Domestic and MNC-owned

21. Smith and Valderrama (2009) endogenize  $\Theta$  by assuming that foreign investors exert a costly effort in searching for with domestic firms. This yields a matching probability increasing in the valuation wedge.

firms produce with capital, labor as well as imported goods using Cobb–Douglas technologies:

$$y_{it}^s = A_t^s (k_{it-1}^s)^{\alpha_K} (l_{it}^s)^{\alpha_L} (m_{it}^s)^{\alpha_M}, \quad (37)$$

where  $m_{it}^s$  denotes imports by firm  $i$  of type  $s \in \{d, f\}$ .

A firm has net worth  $n_{it}^s$  and can now obtain domestic borrowing  $b_{it}^s$  and foreign borrowing  $S_t b_{it}^{*s}$  to purchase capital  $Q_t k_{it}^s$ .  $S_t$  denotes the real exchange rate. The firm's balance sheet is

$$n_{it}^s + b_{it}^s + S_t b_{it}^{*s} = Q_t k_{it}^s. \quad (38)$$

We introduce financial frictions following Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2016). We assume a firm's ability to divert funds depends on the sources and uses of funds. Specifically, we assume  $V_{it}^s \geq \theta_t^s [1 + 0.5\gamma^s (x_{it}^s)^2] Q_t k_{it}^s$ , where  $x_{it}^s \equiv S_t b_{it}^{*s} / (Q_t k_{it}^s)$  is the fraction of international borrowing. If  $x_{it}^s = 0$ , then  $\theta_t^s$  is the fraction of divertible fund when a firm only borrows in the domestic financial market. A positive  $\gamma^s$  means that the firm can divert a larger fraction of assets when it borrows in international financial markets  $x_{it}^s$ .

When the exchange rate is included, foreign investors take into account expected exchange rate changes when they evaluate the value of the firms in the small open economy. The value of an MNC-owned firm is now given by

$$V_{it}^f = \max E_t \left\{ \Lambda_{t,t+1}^* \frac{S_t}{S_{t+1}} \left[ (1 - \kappa) n_{it+1}^f + \kappa V_{it+1}^f \right] \right\}, \quad (39)$$

where  $\Lambda_{t,t+1}^* = 1/R_{t+1}^*$  denotes the stochastic discount factor of foreign investors.<sup>22</sup>

Domestic firms have production function analogous to that of MNC-owned firms (except the fact that acquisition  $\Theta_t$  is an endogenous variable). We continue to assume that domestic firms face tighter incentive constraints than MNC-owned firms, which means that  $\theta_t^d > \theta_t^f \equiv \theta^f$ . Matching between domestic firms and MNCs lead to acquisition of domestic firms, and the acquisition value is given by equation (9). If the financial constraints are always binding, firms' values are given by

$$\psi_t^s = \mu_t^s \phi_t^s + \eta_t^s \phi_t^s x_t^s + v_t^s, \quad \text{for } s \in \{d, f\}.$$

22. Suppose foreign investors can save by buying foreign risk-free bonds, which pays a return of  $R_t^*$ , or by investing in MNC-owned firms in the small open economy. The optimal choice of foreign bonds satisfies  $E_t(\Lambda_{t,t+1}^* R_{t+1}^*) = 1$ . Our approximation is correct up to the first-order approximation. The optimal choice of stocks of MNC-owned domestic firms satisfies

$$E_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1}^* \left( R_{t+1}^* - \frac{S_t}{S_{t+1}} \frac{[(1 - \kappa) n_{it+1}^f + \kappa V_{it+1}^f]}{V_{it}^f} \right) \right] = 0.$$



The linearity of the value functions are still preserved, and so all firms within each type choose the same leverage  $\phi_t^s$  and share of foreign borrowing  $x_t^s$ , given by

$$\phi_t^s = \frac{v_t^s}{\theta_t^s \left(1 + \frac{\gamma^s}{2} (x_t^s)^2\right) - \mu_t^s - \eta_t^s x_t^s}, \quad (40)$$

$$x_t^s = \frac{\mu_t^s}{\eta_t^s} \left[ -1 + \sqrt{1 + \frac{2}{\gamma^s} \left(\frac{\eta_t^s}{\mu_t^s}\right)^2} \right], \quad \text{for } s \in \{d, f\}. \quad (41)$$

As before, the variables  $v_t^s$  and  $\mu_t^s$  denote the marginal value of net worth and excess marginal value of capital for type- $s$  firms, respectively. The variable  $\eta_t^s$  denotes the cost advantage of foreign borrowing relative to domestic borrowing for type- $s$  firm. Equation (41) states that, *ceteris paribus*, a rise in  $\eta_t^s$  makes international borrowing cheaper, which increases the share of foreign borrowing for firm type- $s$ . The expressions for  $v_t^s$ ,  $\mu_t^s$ , and  $\eta_t^s$  are given in Appendix D.

Households and capital goods producers face identical problems as in the benchmark model.

The external account of the small open economy is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \text{export}_t - S_t M_t &= (1 - \kappa) \left( R_{kt}^f Q_{t-1} K_{t-1}^f - R_t^d B_{t-1}^f - R_t^* S_t B_{t-1}^{*f} \right) \\ &\quad - \sigma \Theta_t V_t^{\text{nash}} + S_t (R_t^* B_{t-1}^* - B_t^*), \end{aligned} \quad (42)$$

where foreign demand of domestic good is assumed to follow  $\text{export}_t = S_t^f \bar{\text{export}}_t$ , and  $\zeta$  is the exchange rate elasticity of exports. In equilibrium, domestic households save and finance all domestic loans.

To summarize, the real exchange rate influences model dynamics through three channels: (i) imports and exports, (ii) portfolio choice in domestic and MNC-owned firms, and (iii) foreign investors valuation of MNC-owned firms. A standard exchange rate channel works through imports and exports. An exchange rate depreciation hurts the firms more if they rely heavily on imported goods, which reduces firms' net worth. This effect strengthens the quantity effect of FDI. Exchange rate adjustments also affect the portfolio choice of firms. Suppose a financial shock hits, the real exchange rate depreciates immediately and there is an appreciation expectation along the adjustment path. This makes borrowing in international financial markets more attractive and triggers firms to adjust their portfolio toward foreign borrowing. Such portfolio adjustment reduces the current account surplus and the fall in consumption and investment. This results in a smaller fall in  $Q$  and in firms' net worth. Finally, as shown in equation (39), expected real exchange rate appreciation also increases foreign investors valuation gap directly, thus increasing the attractiveness of acquisition.

Introducing the debt portfolio choice problem in the firms' reduces  $\rho(Y, \text{Debt})$  in the model in both normal and crisis times. Although the financial accelerator

mechanism still exists so total debt is highly procyclical, the composition of domestic and external debt varies over the business cycle. For instance, when the foreign interest rate increases, the real exchange rate responds by depreciating immediately and appreciating subsequently. Firms use a larger share of external borrowing due to an exchange rate appreciation expectation, making  $\rho(Y, \text{Debt})$  less procyclical.

We calibrate the model to study the quantitative performance of the extended model. We keep the parameters in Table 2. We calibrate  $\Upsilon$  to match the observed increase in acquisition probability during the Asian financial crisis. Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) find that this probability increases by 91% between 1996 and 1998. However, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) argue that the crisis coincided with a global wave of cross-border acquisitions, so some of the increase in acquisition probability may not be attributed to the cyclical change. We calibrate the sensitivity parameter  $\Upsilon = 0.15$ , which corresponds to 16% cumulative increase in acquisition probability in the first eight quarters after a one standard deviation financial shock. The import share in production  $\alpha_M$  is set to 0.13 so that steady-state import is 15% of GDP. We set  $\zeta = 1.5$ . We choose  $\gamma^d = 5$  and  $\gamma^f = 1.5$ , reflecting the fact that MNC-owned firms can better manage their foreign debts. In the steady state,  $\bar{x}^d = 24\%$  of domestic firms' debt is borrowed in international financial markets, whereas the proportion of foreign borrowing is  $\bar{x}^f = 35\%$ . Furthermore, the model implies a steady-state external debt to GDP ratio of 55%, consistent with the observed data.

Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 compare the second moments generated by this model with the data and the benchmark model. The extended model still Generates positive correlations between FDI and output in normal times (0.45) and which drops to  $(-0.28)$  in crisis times. Correlations between output and external debt remains positive in both periods. Moreover, as explained above, the correlations in normal times are lower than those in the benchmark model, and are closer to observed data. The extended model also generates consumption and investment volatilities broadly consistent with the data. Consumption and investment volatilities are lower than those in the benchmark model mainly because firms in the extended model do not rely entirely on external debt, and so the current account surplus during a crisis is smaller. Our main results are qualitatively unchanged in this extended model.

## 6. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we study the cyclical behavior of FDI and external debt inflows to emerging economies. We show that FDI in emerging economies moves procyclically in normal times but not so much during crises. We develop a theoretical framework featuring financial frictions and financial shocks to analyze the dynamic pattern of FDI and debt financing in emerging economies. Our model successfully produces positive correlations between FDI and external debt in normal times and small negative correlations during crises. We embed a credit constraint in a small open economy setup. The existence of an uneven degree of financial frictions facing domestically

owned and MNC-owned firms generates flows of direct investment from MNCs to domestic firms in emerging economies. Facing a negative financial shock, the wedge between the valuations of MNC-owned and domestically owned firms increases leading to FDI by MNCs into emerging economies. The deterioration in financial conditions also reduces the borrowing ability of domestic firms and, as a result, debt falls. Therefore, the model accounts for both a significant decline in the external debt position of emerging economies during economic crises, and the relative stability of FDI.

The findings of this paper have important policy implications. The liberalization of financial markets has resulted in large capital inflows to emerging economies. However, this raises the risk of possible destabilizing macroeconomic effects created by short-term debt inflows. Our results show that unlike FDI, debt inflows are strongly procyclical and have an amplification effect on the economic cycle during crises. With an imperfect financial market and excessive leveraging built up in good times, the danger of sudden stops in debt inflows may cause economic disruption. Therefore, from the perspective of smoothing out economic fluctuations, FDI offers a more promising avenue to development in emerging economies.

APPENDIX A: FULL SYSTEM

Firms acquired by foreign MNCs:

$$Y_t^f = \chi A_t \left( K_{t-1}^f \right)^\alpha \left( L_t^f \right)^{1-\alpha}, \tag{A1}$$

$$w_t L_t^f = (1 - \alpha) Y_t^f, \tag{A2}$$

$$R_{kt}^f = \frac{\alpha \frac{Y_t^f}{K_{t-1}^f} + (1 - \delta) Q_t}{Q_{t-1}}, \tag{A3}$$

$$\phi_t^f N_t^f = Q_t K_t^f, \tag{A4}$$

$$\phi_t^f = \frac{v_t^f}{\theta^f - \mu_t^f}, \tag{A5}$$

$$\mu_t^f = E_t \left\{ \Lambda_{t,t+1}^* [(1 - \kappa) + \kappa \theta^f \phi_{t+1}^f] \left( R_{kt+1}^f - R_{t+1}^* \right) \right\}, \tag{A6}$$

$$v_t^f = E_t \left\{ \Lambda_{t,t+1}^* \left[ (1 - \kappa) + \kappa \theta^f \phi_{t+1}^f \right] R_{t+1}^* \right\}. \quad (\text{A7})$$

Domestic firms:

$$Y_t^d = A_t (K_{t-1}^d)^\alpha (L_t^d)^{1-\alpha}, \quad (\text{A8})$$

$$w_t L_t^d = (1 - \alpha) Y_t^d, \quad (\text{A9})$$

$$R_{kt}^d = \frac{\alpha \frac{Y_t^d}{K_{t-1}^d} + (1 - \delta) Q_t}{Q_{t-1}}, \quad (\text{A10})$$

$$\phi_t^d N_t^d = Q_t K_t^d, \quad (\text{A11})$$

$$\phi_t^d = \frac{v_t^d}{\theta_t^d - \mu_t^d}, \quad (\text{A12})$$

$$\mu_t^d = E_t \left\{ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left[ (1 - \sigma) + \sigma \Theta_{t+1} \psi_{t+1}^{nash} + \sigma (1 - \Theta_{t+1}) \theta_{t+1}^d \phi_{t+1}^d \right] (R_{kt+1}^d - R_{t+1}^*) \right\}, \quad (\text{A13})$$

$$v_t^d = E_t \left\{ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left[ (1 - \sigma) + \sigma \Theta_{t+1} \psi_{t+1}^{nash} + \sigma (1 - \Theta_{t+1}) \theta_{t+1}^d \phi_{t+1}^d \right] R_{t+1}^* \right\}, \quad (\text{A14})$$

$$\psi_t^{nash} = \xi \theta^f \phi_t^f + (1 - \xi) \theta_t^d \phi_t^d. \quad (\text{A15})$$

Matching:

$$\Theta_t = \Theta. \quad (\text{A16})$$

Goods market clearing:

$$N_t^d = \sigma (1 - \Theta_t) \left[ (R_{kt}^d - R_t^*) \phi_{t-1}^d + R_t^* \right] N_{t-1}^d + \omega Q_t K_{t-1}^d, \quad (\text{A17})$$

$$N_t^f = \kappa \left[ \left( R_{kt}^f - R_t^* \right) \phi_{t-1}^f + R_t^* \right] N_{t-1}^f + \sigma \Theta_t \left[ \left( R_{kt}^d - R_t^* \right) \phi_{t-1}^d + R_t^* \right] N_{t-1}^d, \quad (\text{A18})$$

$$Y_t = Y_t^d + Y_t^f, \quad (\text{A19})$$

$$L_t = L_t^d + L_t^f, \quad (\text{A20})$$

$$K_t = K_t^d + K_t^f, \quad (\text{A21})$$

$$Y_t - C_t - I_t = (1 - \kappa) \left[ R_{kt}^f Q_{t-1} K_{t-1}^f - R_t^* B_{t-1}^{*f} \right] - \sigma \Theta_t \psi_t^{nash} N_t^d + R_t^* B_{t-1}^{*d} - B_t^*, \quad (\text{A22})$$

$$B_t^{*d} \equiv Q_t K_t^d - N_t^d, \quad (\text{A23})$$

$$B_t^{*f} \equiv Q_t K_t^f - N_t^f, \quad (\text{A24})$$

$$B_t^* \equiv B_t^{*d} + B_t^{*f}. \quad (\text{A25})$$

Capital production:

$$K_t = (1 - \delta) K_{t-1} + (1 - Adj_t) I_t, \quad (\text{A26})$$

$$1 = Q_t \left[ 1 - Adj_t - \Psi^I \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} \left( \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} - 1 \right) \right] + E_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} Q_{t+1} \Psi^I \left( \frac{I_{t+1}}{I_t} \right)^2 \left( \frac{I_{t+1}}{I_t} - 1 \right) \right]. \quad (\text{A27})$$

Domestic households:

$$w_t = \Psi^L L_t^\varphi, \quad (\text{A28})$$

$$1 = E_t (\Lambda_{t,t+1} R_{t+1}^d), \quad (\text{A29})$$

$$\Lambda_{t-1,t} = \beta \frac{\left( C_{t-1} - \Psi^L \frac{L_{t-1}^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi} \right)}{\left( C_t - \Psi^L \frac{L_t^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi} \right)}. \quad (\text{A30})$$

We can write down some auxiliary variables of interest :

$$\begin{aligned} \psi_t^d &= \mu_t^d \phi_t^d + v_t^d \\ \psi_t^f &= \mu_t^f \phi_t^f + v_t^f \\ \text{FDI inflow}_t &= \sigma \Theta_t \psi_t^{\text{nash}} N_t^d. \end{aligned}$$

## APPENDIX B: DERIVATION OF THE MARKET CLEARING CONDITION

This section derives the balance of payment condition in the main text. We start with an individual household's budget constraint:

$$\begin{aligned} w_t L_t + R_t^d D_{t-1}^d + \int_i s_{it-1} [(1-\sigma)n_{it} + \sigma \Theta_t V_{it}^{\text{nash}} + \sigma(1-\Theta_t)V_{it}] di \\ - tr_t + \Pi_t^k = C_t + \int_i s_{it} V_{it} di + D_t^d. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B1})$$

We integrate over  $i$  to get

$$w_t L_t + (1-\sigma) [R_{kt}^d Q_{t-1} K_{t-1}^d - R_t^* B_{t-1}^d] + \sigma \Theta_t V_t^{\text{nash}} - tr_t + \Pi_t^k = C_t, \quad (\text{B2})$$

which can be written as

$$\begin{aligned} w_t L_t + R_{kt}^d Q_{t-1} K_{t-1}^d + \sigma \Theta_t V_t^{\text{nash}} + \Pi_t^k = C_t + \sigma (R_{kt}^d Q_{t-1} K_{t-1}^d - R_t^* B_{t-1}^d) \\ + R_t^* B_{t-1}^d + tr_t. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B3})$$

Plug in  $N_t^d$ , we can get

$$\begin{aligned} w_t L_t + R_{kt}^d Q_{t-1} K_{t-1}^d + \sigma \Theta_t V_t^{\text{nash}} + \Pi_t^k = C_t + N_t^d + \sigma \Theta_t (R_{kt}^d Q_{t-1} K_{t-1}^d \\ - R_t^* B_{t-1}^d) + R_t^* B_{t-1}^d. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B4})$$

Plug in  $N_t^f$ , we can get

$$w_t L_t + R_{kt}^d Q_{t-1} K_{t-1}^d + \sigma \Theta_t V_t^{nash} + \Pi_t^k = C_t + N_t^d + N_t^f - \kappa \left[ R_{kt}^f Q_{t-1} K_{t-1}^f - R_t^* B_{t-1}^f \right] + R_t^* B_{t-1}^d. \quad (B5)$$

Since  $B_t^f + B_t^d = B_t$ , we can write the above equation as

$$w_t L_t + R_{kt}^d Q_{t-1} K_{t-1}^d + \kappa R_{kt}^f Q_{t-1} K_{t-1}^f + \sigma \Theta_t V_t^{nash} + \Pi_t^k = C_t + N_t^d + N_t^f - (1 - \kappa) R_t^* B_{t-1}^f + R_t^* B_{t-1}. \quad (B6)$$

Rewrite it,

$$w_t L_t + R_{kt}^d Q_{t-1} K_{t-1}^d + R_{kt}^f Q_{t-1} K_{t-1}^f + \sigma \Theta_t V_t^{nash} + \Pi_t^k = C_t + N_t^d + N_t^f + (1 - \kappa) \left[ R_{kt}^f Q_{t-1} K_{t-1}^f - R_t^* B_{t-1}^f \right] + R_t^* B_{t-1}. \quad (B7)$$

Plug in  $R_{kt}^d$ , we can get

$$w_t L_t + \left( r_{kt}^f + (1 - \delta) Q_t \right) K_{t-1}^f + \left( r_{kt}^d + (1 - \delta) Q_t \right) K_{t-1}^d + \sigma \Theta_t V_t^{nash} + \Pi_t^k = C_t + N_t^d + N_t^f + (1 - \kappa) \left[ R_{kt}^f Q_{t-1} K_{t-1}^f - R_t^* B_{t-1}^f \right] + R_t^* B_{t-1}. \quad (B8)$$

According to the producer's problem, we can get

$$Y_t^d + Y_t^f + \sigma \Theta_t V_t^{nash} + \Pi_t^k = C_t + N_t^d + N_t^f + (1 - \kappa) \left[ R_{kt}^f Q_{t-1} K_{t-1}^f - R_t^* B_{t-1}^f \right] + R_t^* B_{t-1}. \quad (B9)$$

Plug in capital producer's profit  $\Pi_t^K = Q_t [K_t - (1 - \delta) K_{t-1}] - I_t$ , we can get

$$Y_t + \sigma \Theta_t V_t^{nash} + Q_t K_t = C_t + N_t^d + N_t^f + (1 - \kappa) \left[ R_{kt}^f Q_{t-1} K_{t-1}^f - R_t^* B_{t-1}^f \right] + R_t^* B_{t-1} + I_t. \quad (B10)$$

Plug in  $Q_t K_t = N_t + B_t$ , we can get

$$Y_t + \sigma \Theta_t V_t^{nash} + N_t^d + N_t^f + B_t = C_t + N_t^d + N_t^f + (1 - \kappa) \left[ R_{kt}^f Q_{t-1} K_{t-1}^f - R_t^* B_{t-1}^f \right] + R_t^* B_{t-1} + I_t. \quad (B11)$$

In the end, we get

$$\begin{aligned}
 \underbrace{Y_t - C_t - I_t}_{\text{current account (net exports)}} &= \underbrace{(1 - \kappa) \left[ R_{kt}^f Q_{t-1} K_{t-1}^f - R_t^* B_{t-1}^f \right]}_{\substack{\text{FDI outflows} \\ \text{equity financing}}} - \underbrace{\sigma \Theta_t V_t^{nash}}_{\text{FDI inflows}} \\
 &+ \underbrace{R_t^* B_{t-1} - B_t}_{\text{debt financing}}. \tag{B12}
 \end{aligned}$$

### APPENDIX C: CALIBRATION STRATEGY

We discuss our calibration strategy of the benchmark model. Given the steady-state spread  $R_k^d/R^* = 1.007$ , we get  $R_k^d = 1.0169$ . Furthermore, since  $r_k^f = r_k^d \chi^{(1/\alpha)}$ , we get

$$R_k^f = [R_k^d - (1 - \delta)] \chi^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} + 1 - \delta = 1.0211.$$

To calibrate the rest of the financial contract, we note that the credit contract conditions need to be satisfied:

$$\phi^f = \frac{v^f}{\theta^f - \mu^f}, \tag{C1}$$

$$\mu^f = \frac{1}{R^*} (1 - \kappa + \kappa \theta^f \phi^f) (R_k^f - R^*), \tag{C2}$$

$$v^f = 1 - \kappa + \kappa \theta^f \phi^f, \tag{C3}$$

$$\phi^d = \frac{v^d}{\bar{\theta}^d - \mu^d}, \tag{C4}$$

$$\mu^d = \beta(1 - \sigma + \sigma \Theta \psi^{nash} + \sigma(1 - \Theta) \bar{\theta}^d \phi^d) (R_k^d - R^*), \tag{C5}$$

$$v^d = \beta(1 - \sigma + \sigma \Theta \psi^{nash} + \sigma(1 - \Theta) \bar{\theta}^d \phi^d) R^*, \tag{C6}$$



$$\psi^{nash} = \xi \theta^f \phi^f + (1 - \xi) \bar{\theta}^d \phi^d. \tag{C7}$$

Rearranging the steady-state version of the evolution of MNC-owned firms' net worth, we get

$$\frac{N^f}{N^d} = \frac{\sigma \Theta [(R_k^d - R^*) \phi^d + R^*]}{1 - \kappa [(R_k^f - R^*) \phi^f + R^*]}. \tag{C8}$$

The capital ratio is given by

$$\frac{K^f}{K^d} = \frac{\phi^f N^f}{\phi^d N^d}, \tag{C9}$$

$$\frac{K^d}{K} = \frac{K_d}{K^d + K^f} = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{K^f}{K^d}}. \tag{C10}$$

Output ratios are given by

$$\frac{Y^f}{Y^d} = \chi^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} \frac{K^f}{K^d}. \tag{C11}$$

The stock of FDI to output ratio is

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{sFDI}{Y} &= \frac{\psi^f N^f}{Y} = (\mu^f \phi^f + v^f) \frac{N^f}{K^f} \frac{K^f}{Y^f} \frac{Y^f}{Y} \\ &= \frac{(\mu^f \phi^f + v^f)}{\phi^f} \frac{\alpha}{R_k^f - (1 - \delta)} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{1 + \frac{Y^f}{Y^d}} \right). \end{aligned} \tag{C12}$$

The above 12 equations solve for two unknown parameters  $\{\theta^f, \Theta\}$  and 10 steady-state values  $\{\phi^f, \mu^f, v^f, \mu^d, v^d, \psi^{nash}, N^f/N^d, K^f/K^d, Y^f/Y^d, \bar{\theta}^d\}$ , given known parameters  $\{R^*, \kappa, \sigma, \xi, \alpha, \chi, \beta, \delta\}$  and the steady-state targets of  $\{\phi^d, K^d/K, sFDI/Y\}$ .

The evolution of domestic firms' net worth is used to back out the start-up fund parameter  $\omega$ :

$$\omega = \frac{\{1 - \sigma(1 - \Theta)[(R_k^d - R^*) \phi^d + R^*]\}}{\phi^d}. \tag{C13}$$

## APPENDIX D: EXTENDED MODEL

This appendix describes in detail the extended model that allows for endogenous real exchange rate adjustments and a portfolio choice problem of the firms in a small open economy—they can borrow domestically and in international financial markets, facing different interest rates. To do this, we follow the approach of Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2016), which extends the credit contract in Gertler and Karadi (2011).

## D.1 Firms

There is a unit measure of firms  $i \in [0, 1]$ . Some are owned by domestic households and some by foreign MNCs. Firms acquired by MNCs have superscript  $f$ , whereas domestic firms have superscript  $d$ . These firms have the following production function:

$$y_{it}^s = A_t^s (k_{it-1}^s)^{\alpha_K} (l_{it}^s)^{\alpha_L} (m_{it}^s)^{\alpha_M}, \quad \text{where } s \in \{d, f\}, \quad (\text{D1})$$

where  $k_{it-1}^s$  denotes capital,  $l_{it}^s$  denotes labor,  $m_{it}^s$  denotes imports. We assume  $A_t^d = A_t$ ,  $A_t^f = \chi A_t$ , where  $\chi \geq 1$  captures higher productivity in MNC-owned firms due to technology spillovers.

A firm has net worth  $n_{it}^s$  and can now obtain domestic borrowing  $b_{it}^s$  and foreign borrowing  $S_t b_{it}^{*s}$  to purchase capital  $Q_t k_{it}^s$ .  $S_t$  denotes the real exchange rate. The firm's balance sheet is  $n_{it}^s + b_{it}^s + S_t b_{it}^{*s} = Q_t k_{it}^s$ . After production, the firm sells depreciated capital and repays domestic and foreign borrowing with interest. The firm's net worth evolves as follows:

$$n_{it}^s = r_{kt}^s k_{it-1}^s + (1 - \delta) Q_t k_{it-1}^s - R_t^d b_{it-1}^s - R_t^* S_t b_{it-1}^{*s}, \quad (\text{D2})$$

where  $r_{kt}^s$  is the marginal product of capital of a type- $s$  firm, given by

$$r_{kt}^s k_{it-1}^s \equiv \max_{l_{it}^s, m_{it}^s} \{y_{it}^s - w_t l_{it}^s - S_t m_{it}^s\}.$$

We introduce financial frictions following Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2016). Specifically, assume a firm's ability to divert funds depends on the sources and use of funds. We assume  $V_{it}^s \geq \theta_t^s [1 + 0.5\gamma^s (x_{it}^s)^2] Q_t k_{it}^s$ , where  $x_{it}^s \equiv S_t b_{it}^{*s} / (Q_t k_{it}^s)$  is the fraction of international borrowing. The variable  $\theta_t^s$  is the fraction of divertible fund when a type- $s$  firm only borrows in the local financial market. A positive  $\gamma^s$  means that a firm can divert a larger fraction of assets when it borrows in international financial markets  $x_{it}^s$ . In equilibrium, the incentive constraint must be satisfied so that default will not occur. As in the benchmark model, we assume that the fraction of divertible funds for domestic firms,  $\theta_t^d$ , follows an exogenous process, but  $\theta^f$  is a constant. Moreover, we assume that domestic firms face tighter incentive constraints than MNC-owned firms, reflecting the poorer ability of domestically owned firms to access international financial markets. This means that  $\theta_t^d > \theta^f$ .

We discuss the values of MNC-owned and domestic firms. At time  $t$ , an MNC-owned firm chooses amount to borrow in the financial market. After production takes place, in period  $t + 1$ , there is an exogenous probability,  $(1 - \kappa)$ , a firm exits. The firm will keep accumulating assets until it leaves the industry because it earns a risk-adjusted return that is greater than the world interest rate. The purpose of the firm is to maximize the expected terminal wealth, given by

$$V_{it}^f = \max E_t \left\{ \Lambda_{t,t+1}^* \frac{S_t}{S_{t+1}} \left[ (1 - \kappa)n_{it+1}^f + \kappa V_{it+1}^f \right] \right\}, \quad (\text{D3})$$

where  $\Lambda_{t,t+1}^*$  denotes the stochastic discount factor of foreign investors. For simplicity, assume  $\Lambda_{t,t+1}^* = 1/R_{t+1}^*$ .<sup>23</sup>

Domestic firms' value function is the same as the one in the benchmark model. A domestic firm exits in a given period with an exogenous probability  $\sigma$ . If it exits, the net worth is transferred back to households. If it does not exit, there is a probability  $\Theta_t$  it is matched with a foreign MNC. The foreign MNC buys the domestic firm with a price  $V_{it+1}^{nash}$  and this value is transferred back to households. The domestic firm treats the probability  $\Theta_t$  as exogenous. With probability  $\sigma(1 - \Theta_t)$  the firm continues to operate. The value of a domestic firm is given by

$$V_{it}^d = \max E_t \left\{ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left[ (1 - \sigma)n_{it+1}^d + \sigma \left[ \Theta_{t+1} V_{it+1}^{nash} + (1 - \Theta_{t+1}) V_{it+1}^d \right] \right] \right\}. \quad (\text{D4})$$

Matching between a domestic firm and an MNC lead to an acquisition. The acquisition value is given by equation (9).

If the financial constraints are always binding, firms' values are given by

$$\psi_t^s = \mu_t^s \phi_t^s + \eta_t^s \phi_t^s x_t^s + v_t^s, \quad \text{for } s \in \{d, f\},$$

where  $\psi_t^s \equiv V_{it}^s/n_{it}^s$  is the value per unit net worth for type- $s$  firm, and  $\phi_t^s \equiv Q_t K_{it}^s/N_{it}^s$  is the leverage for type- $s$  firm. Both  $\psi_t^s$  and  $\phi_t^s$  are identical for firms within each type. The variables  $\mu_t^f, \eta_t^f, v_t^f, \mu_t^d, \eta_t^d, v_t^d$  are given by

$$\mu_t^f \equiv E_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1}^* \Omega_{t+1}^* \frac{S_t}{S_{t+1}} \left( R_{kt+1}^f - R_{t+1}^d \right) \right], \quad (\text{D5})$$

$$\eta_t^f \equiv E_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1}^* \Omega_{t+1}^* \frac{S_t}{S_{t+1}} \left( R_{t+1}^d - R_{t+1}^* \frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t} \right) \right], \quad (\text{D6})$$

23. Suppose foreign investors can save by buying foreign risk-free bonds, which pays a return of  $R_t^*$ , or by investing in MNC-owned firms in the small open economy. The optimal choice of foreign bonds satisfies  $E_t(\Lambda_{t,t+1}^* R_{t+1}^*) = 1$ . Our approximation is correct up to first-order approximation. The optimal choice of stocks of MNC-owned domestic firms satisfies

$$E_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1}^* \left( R_{t+1}^* - \frac{S_t}{S_{t+1}} \frac{[(1 - \kappa)n_{it+1}^f + \kappa V_{it+1}^f]}{V_{it}^f} \right) \right] = 0.$$

$$v_t^f \equiv E_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1}^* \Omega_{t+1}^* \frac{S_t}{S_{t+1}} R_{t+1}^d \right], \quad (\text{D7})$$

$$\mu_t^d \equiv E_t [\Lambda_{t,t+1} \Omega_{t+1} (R_{kt+1}^d - R_{t+1}^d)], \quad (\text{D8})$$

$$\eta_t^d \equiv E_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \Omega_{t+1} \left( R_{t+1}^d - R_{t+1}^* \frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t} \right) \right], \quad (\text{D9})$$

$$v_t^d \equiv E_t [\Lambda_{t,t+1} \Omega_{t+1} R_{t+1}^d], \quad (\text{D10})$$

where

$$\Omega_{t+1}^* \equiv (1 - \kappa) + \kappa \psi_{t+1}^f, \quad (\text{D11})$$

$$\Omega_{t+1} \equiv (1 - \sigma) + \sigma \Theta_{t+1} \psi_{t+1}^{nash} + \sigma(1 - \Theta_{t+1}) \psi_{t+1}, \quad (\text{D12})$$

$$R_{kt}^s \equiv \frac{r_{kt}^s + (1 - \delta) Q_t}{Q_{t-1}}, \quad \text{for } s \in \{d, f\}. \quad (\text{D13})$$

The interpretation of the value function is similar to what is discussed for the benchmark model. There are two differences. First, with endogenous exchange rate movements, MNCs take into account expected exchange rate deviations when they evaluate the returns in the small open economy. Second, since firms can borrow domestically and internationally with imperfect financial markets, the marginal value of a unit of domestic borrowing and international borrowing are different.

The optimal share of foreign borrowing  $x_t^s$  is common for every type- $s$  firm, and is given by

$$x_t^s = \frac{\mu_t^s}{\eta_t^s} \left( -1 + \sqrt{1 + \frac{2}{\gamma^s} \left( \frac{\eta_t^s}{\mu_t^s} \right)^2} \right), \quad \text{for } s \in \{d, f\}. \quad (\text{D14})$$

We briefly discuss the property of  $x_t^f$ . First,  $x_t^f$  is decreasing in  $\gamma^f$ . When the size of divertible fraction of firm value when it borrows abroad  $\gamma^f$  is larger, each unit of foreign loan tightens the financial constraint by more, so it chooses less foreign loans and  $x_t^f$  is smaller. Second, we can show that  $x_t^f$  is locally increasing

in  $\eta_t^{*f} \equiv \eta_t^f / \mu_t^f$ .<sup>24</sup> The intuition is as follows.  $\eta^f$  measures the cost advantage (in terms of marginal value of the firm) of borrowing in international financial markets versus in the small open economy.  $\eta_t^{*f}$  weighs this by the total excess marginal value of raising outside funds. When the weighted cost advantage of borrowing in international financial markets rises, the fraction of foreign borrowing increases.

Since the leverage constraint is binding, the optimal leverage for type- $s$  firm is given by

$$\phi_t^s = \frac{v_t^s}{\theta_t^s \left(1 + \frac{\gamma^s}{2} (x_t^s)^2\right) - \mu_t^s - \eta_t^s x_t^s}, \tag{D15}$$

the linearity of the value functions is still preserved and this allows simple aggregation of the model.

### D.2 Aggregation

Since each type of firms has the same capital to labor ratio, same leverage and same share of external debt, we only need to keep track of the sector level quantities. For  $Z \in \{Y, K, L, M, N, B, B^*\}$ , we have

$$Z_t^d = \int_i z_{it}^d di, \quad Z_t^f = \int_i z_{it}^f di.$$

Furthermore, aggregate quantities are given by  $Z_t = Z_t^d + Z_t^f$ .

In each period, a fraction  $(1 - \sigma)$  of domestic firms die. Furthermore, for foreign-owned firms, matches dissolve with an exogenous separation rate  $(1 - \kappa)$ . When a multinational separates from a local firm, it takes the net worth. An equal measure of new domestic firms enter, with start-up funds transferred from domestic households.

Net worth of domestic firms evolves as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} N_t^d = & \sigma(1 - \Theta_t) \left[ (R_{kt}^d - R_t^d) \phi_{t-1} + \left( R_t^d - R_t^* \frac{S_t}{S_{t-1}} \right) \phi_{t-1} x_{t-1} + R_t^d \right] N_{t-1}^d \\ & + \omega Q_t K_{t-1}^d, \end{aligned} \tag{D16}$$

where  $\omega Q_t K_{t-1}^d$  is the start-up fund.

Net worth of firms owned by MNCs evolves as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} N_t^f = & \kappa \left[ \left( R_{kt}^f - R_t^d \right) \phi_{t-1}^f + \left( R_t^d - R_t^* \frac{S_t}{S_{t-1}} \right) \phi_{t-1}^f x_{t-1}^f + R_t^d \right] N_{t-1}^f \\ & + \sigma \Theta_t \left[ \left( R_{kt}^d - R_t^d \right) \phi_{t-1} + \left( R_t^d - R_t^* \frac{S_t}{S_{t-1}} \right) \phi_{t-1} x_{t-1} + R_t^d \right] N_{t-1}^d. \end{aligned} \tag{D17}$$

24. See Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2016) for detailed discussion.

### D.3 Capital Goods Producers

The formulation of capital goods producers is identical to the benchmark model. The evolution of capital is given by

$$K_t = (1 - \delta)K_{t-1} + (1 - Adj_t)I_t, \quad (D18)$$

where  $Adj_t$  are investment adjustment costs, which have a quadratic form as follows:

$$Adj_t = \frac{\Psi^I}{2} \left( \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} - 1 \right)^2. \quad (D19)$$

The maximization problem for capital goods producers is

$$\max E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \Lambda_{t,t+s} \Pi_{t+s}^K, \quad (D20)$$

where  $\Pi_t^K = Q_t[K_t - (1 - \delta)K_{t-1}] - I_t$ . The first-order condition for the optimal investment choice is

$$\begin{aligned} 1 = & Q_t \left[ 1 - Adj_t - \Psi^I \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} \left( \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} - 1 \right) \right] \\ & + E_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} Q_{t+1} \Psi^I \left( \frac{I_{t+1}}{I_t} \right)^2 \left( \frac{I_{t+1}}{I_t} - 1 \right) \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (D21)$$

### D.4 Domestic Households

A representative household in the small open economy (SOE) maximizes the following GHH utility:

$$U_t = E_t \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \ln \left( C_t - \Psi^L \frac{L_t^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi} \right). \quad (D22)$$

In each period, the representative household receives wage income, returns from domestic lending and from purchase of domestic equities and the profits of capital producing firms. The household consumes, adjusts their domestic lending and equity portfolios and provides a start-up fund to new domestic firms. These mean that the household faces the following budget constraint:

$$\begin{aligned} w_t L_t + R_t^d D_{t-1} + \int_i s_{it-1} [(1 - \sigma)n_{it} + \sigma \Theta_t V_{it}^{nash} + \sigma(1 - \Theta_t)V_{it}] di \\ + \Pi_t^k = C_t + \int_i s_{it} V_{it} di + D_t + tr_t. \end{aligned}$$

The first-order conditions are

$$w_t = \Psi^L L_t^\varphi, \quad (\text{D23})$$

$$1 = E_t(\Lambda_{t,t+1} R_{t+1}^d), \quad (\text{D24})$$

$$\psi_t = \mu_t \phi_t + \eta_t \phi_t x_t + \nu_t, \quad (\text{D25})$$

where

$$\Lambda_{t-1,t} = \beta \frac{\left( C_{t-1} - \Psi^L \frac{L_{t-1}^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi} \right)}{\left( C_t - \Psi^L \frac{L_t^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi} \right)}. \quad (\text{D26})$$

Finally, asset markets clear, which means that  $D_t = B_t$  and  $s_{it} = 1$ , for all  $i$ .

#### D.5 Market Clearing

Goods market clears:

$$C_t + I_t + \text{export}_t = Y_t. \quad (\text{D27})$$

We assume the international demand for domestic good is given by

$$\text{export}_t = \left( \frac{P_t}{e_t P_t^*} \right)^{-5} \text{exp} \bar{\text{port}} = S_t^5 \text{exp} \bar{\text{port}}. \quad (\text{D28})$$

The external account is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \text{export}_t - S_t M_t &= (1 - \kappa) \left( R_{kt}^f Q_{t-1} K_{t-1}^f - R_t^d B_{t-1}^f - R_t^* S_t B_{t-1}^{*f} \right) \\ &\quad - \sigma \Theta_t V_t^{\text{nash}} + S_t (R_t^* B_{t-1}^* - B_t^*). \end{aligned} \quad (\text{D29})$$

Finally, there are exogenous shocks to productivity  $A_t$ , world interest rates  $R_t^*$  and the financial constraint  $\theta_t$ , and these shock processes are identical to those in the benchmark model. This completes the description of the extended model.

#### APPENDIX E: DATA

In this appendix, we describe the main variables used in the empirical analysis and the main data sources. We also list the countries in our sample, along

with the country crisis years. Real GDP (constant local currency units) data are available at the World Bank. Foreign direct investment inflows and external debt financing inflows data are available at the updated and extended version of data set constructed by Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2014), downloaded at [www.sovereign-to-sovereign-flows.com](http://www.sovereign-to-sovereign-flows.com).

Following Broner et al. (2013), crisis years are Argentina: 1980, 1981, 1982, 1987, 1989, 1995, 2001, 2002, 2007; Brazil: 1982, 1983, 1986, 1987, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1999, 2002; Colombia: 1982, 1985, 1998; Indonesia: 1997, 1998, 2002; Korea: 1997, 1998, 2008; Malaysia: 1997, 1998; Mexico: 1981, 1982, 1994, 1995; Peru: 1980, 1981, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1988; Philippines: 1981, 1983, 1997, 1998; Thailand: 1983, 1997, 1998; Turkey: 1982, 1984, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001.

## APPENDIX F: SUMMARY STATISTICS

TABLE F1  
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF FDI AND DEBT INFLOWS

Variable	Mean	p25	p50	p75	Std.	<i>N</i>
FDI	1.92	0.55	1.60	2.88	1.67	395
Debt	1.60	0.08	1.51	3.74	3.87	391

NOTE: This table provides the summary statistics. All flows are gross inflows as a percent of GDP. Annual data are from 1980 to 2015. Countries included are Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey.

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